The Eagle and the Springbok

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Essays on Nigeria and South Africa

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Fanele
(Zul; Xho; Tso): necessary.
This is a necessary book.

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Contents

INTRODUCTION

Africa's Indispensable Bilateral Relationship

Our [Nigeria and South Africa's] location, our destiny and the contemporary forces of globalisation have thrust upon us the burden of turning around the fortunes of our continent. We must not and cannot shy away from this responsibility.[1]

Olusegun Obasanjo, former head of state of Nigeria

Nigeria and South Africa account for about a third of Africa's economic might, and have led much of its peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives over the last two decades and a half. Both account for over 60–70 per cent of the economy of their respective subregions in West and Southern Africa. The success of political and economic integration in Africa thus rests heavily on the shoulders of these two regional Gullivers, who have both collaborated and competed with each other in a complex relationship that is also Africa's most indispensable. Nigeria remains among South Africa's largest trading partners in Africa, while Abuja and Tshwane (Pretoria) have cooperated in building the institutions of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Both countries have sought to give Africa a stronger global voice, but have also competed as rivals on issues such as peacemaking in Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, and Guinea-Bissau. This book's title compares both powers in sports-crazy Nigeria and South Africa to national sporting symbols: Nigeria's Super Eagles soccer team and South Africa's Springbok rugby team.

As a Nigerian who has lived and worked in South Africa since 2003, this

author is particularly well placed to write this book. Though Nigerians and South Africans are increasingly visiting each other's countries (about 48,000 Nigerians visited South Africa in 2015 alone) and trading more profitably with each other (bilateral trade was worth R55 billion in 2016),[2] both countries' citizens still have strong differences of opinion about each other. Nigerians often complain about the ingratitude of South Africans at failing properly to acknowledge their country's support for the liberation struggle against the apartheid regime between 1960 and 1990. They also complain about what they perceive to be Tshwane's mercantilist behaviour in which South African companies make huge profits from Nigeria's large market of 180 million consumers, conduct apartheid-style labour practices, and exclude Nigerian companies from the South African market of 55 million citizens. South Africans, in turn, often complain about the involvement of Nigerian citizens in drug trafficking and fraudulent scams, while its companies lament the bureaucratic obstacles, infrastructural deficits, and widespread corruption that make doing business in Nigeria so frustrating.

Contrasts and Comparisons

Some South African complaints about Nigeria are genuine, but others are based on stereotypes and caricature. It is, for example, sometimes shocking to encounter often xenophobic anti-Nigerian feelings, even among some South African intellectuals. The vast majority of Nigerian citizens in South Africa are law-abiding citizens and many of its professionals contribute positively to South Africa's social and economic life. The vehemence of the anger of some of Nigeria's educated elite against South African companies in Nigeria is also sometimes shocking. It should be noted that South African firms contribute to the variety of goods and services available to Nigerian consumers, and were important in opening up its telecommunications sector and making cell-phone services more widely available to Nigerians from the early 2000s. While South Africans tend to direct their negative stereotypes against Nigerian *citizens*, Nigerians tend to direct their wrath against South African *companies*. Both citizens and companies can, of course, become targets: Nigerian citizens were the objects of horrific xenophobic attacks in South Africa in 2008, 2015, and 2017, while the

Abuja office of South African telecommunications giant Mobile Telephone Networks (MTN) – derided as 'Money Thieving Networks' by Nigerian critics – was attacked in reprisal for the violence against Nigerians in South Africa in 2017.

Flying between Johannesburg and Lagos on South African Airways (SAA) in 2017, the tension between angry Nigerian customers and an often disrespectful and indifferent SAA cabin crew was palpable to this author. Amidst repeated allegations of Nigerian men 'stealing' South African women, South Africans married to Nigerian men founded the United Nigerian Wives in South Africa (UNWISA) in Johannesburg in August 2013 to fight discrimination against their Nigerian husbands and children. During a parliamentary debate in September 2004, South Africa's deputy minister of minerals and energy, Lulu Xingwana, asked Nigerian-born South African opposition parliamentarian, Enyinna Nkem-Obonta, to return to Nigeria where his services were more urgently needed. The rivalry between both countries boiled over yet again in January 2017, when Nigerians expressed anger that the reality show, *Big Brother Naija*, was being broadcast in South Africa. Nigerians went on social media to vent their anger, while their government called for an investigation into what it termed potential 'location fraud'.[3]

A notorious Hollywood movie that reinforced negative South African stereotypes about Nigerians was the 2009 science fiction film *District 9*, directed by South African-born Neill Blomkamp. Nigerian immigrants are particularly singled out for xenophobic stereotyping in this movie. The cannibalistic crime boss of the aliens is named Obesandjo: a crude and tactless reference to the country's president between 1999 and 2007. Blomkamp appears to take a former head of state's surname as representative of the archetypal Nigerian 'criminal.' Nigerians are depicted throughout the movie as involved in drug and arms trafficking, business scams, car theft, prostitution, and witchcraft.[4]

But despite these disagreements and differences in opinion, there are, in fact, many similarities between Nigeria and South Africa: both countries were born as a result of amalgamations – the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Cape and Natal formed the Union of South Africa in 1910, while Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated four years later. Both states have a triad of major ethnic groups: Nigeria's Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and

Igbo, and South Africa's Xhosa, Zulu, and Sotho.[5] Both are now regional powers that account for over 60 per cent of their subregional economies; both have trained regional elites at their universities for decades; both have contributed significantly to peacemaking efforts in Africa; both have economies that are heavily dependent on mineral resources (Nigerian oil and South African gold and diamonds); both have multinational companies – such as South Africa's Anglo American and SABMiller and Nigeria's Zenith Bank and Globacom – which have expanded to dominate their subregional economies.

Both countries have also had a tremendous cultural impact on the continent (as evidenced by 'Nollywood' movies and South African soap operas); both societies are prone to incidents of violence, often witnessing cases of vigilante justice against alleged criminals and 'witches'; and both countries have perpetrated acts of xenophobia against citizens of neighbouring countries. Both countries can be compared to the United States: like Americans, Nigerians are often seen by outsiders as brash, loud, and arrogant; while South Africans, like Americans, share a sense of haughty 'exceptionalism', even as both information-rich societies frequently exhibit gross ignorance about the world and their own continents. While Nigeria struggles with the issue of reconciling its over 250 ethnic groups speaking over 100 distinct languages, South Africa continues to pursue racial reconciliation between its black, mixed-race ('coloured'), white, and Asian populations. While Nigeria is the most ethnically diverse country in Africa, South Africa is the most racially diverse state on the continent. Like Nigeria, South Africa suffers from growing corruption, and is one of the most unequal societies in the world. South Africa and Nigeria both suffer from massive crime, which has made Johannesburg and Lagos two of the most feared cities in the world.

The contrasts between Nigeria and South Africa are also many. While Nigeria's legitimacy as an African power is unchallenged, South Africa's black government continues to struggle with its credibility as an African leader because of the continued dominance by the white minority of its economy and much of its higher education and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sectors. While South Africa's black majority struggles to emerge from the legacy of apartheid-era Bantu education, Nigeria has trained three generations of self-confident students and has the largest black intelligentsia

anywhere in the world. While the entrepreneurial spirit of Nigerians – from Nollywood to street hawkers – has ensured it a reputation for resourceful innovativeness, South Africa struggles to implement economic measures to empower its black majority. While Nigeria represents the most indigenously diverse country in Africa, South Africa is undoubtedly the continent's most Westernised state.

While South Africa has been able to limit challenges to state authority, a terrorist group, Boko Haram, killed an estimated 20,000 people in north-east Nigeria and internally displaced nearly two million people between 2009 and 2017.[6] While South Africa has, for years, had a steel industry that has fed its arms manufacturers, Nigeria's Ajaokuta Steel Complex – planned since the early 1970s and costing $5 billion – became a white elephant mired in corruption and inefficiency. While South Africa's digital-based cellular telecommunications network is among the world's largest, Nigeria's phone system continues to be notoriously erratic. South Africa produces ten times more electricity than Nigeria; the Johannesburg Stock Exchange's market capitalisation is 15 times larger than Nigeria's; and South Africa has more truly global multinational companies like Anglo American and SABMiller than Nigeria. While South Africa has several well-funded, world-class universities with well-stocked libraries, Nigeria's ivory towers are crumbling monuments to years of neglect and government closures. While South Africa has impressive transport and other infrastructure, Nigeria suffers from massive infrastructural deficits. While South Africa's liberal constitution of 1996 protects gay rights, Nigeria passed legislation in 2014 criminalising homosexuality (with 14-year jail terms).

Context and Contents

Only one detailed book has sought so far to address issues around Nigeria and South Africa. The late Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui's book of rich essays was published over a decade ago in 2006, and did not represent a comprehensive attempt to examine bilateral ties, instead focusing on disparate issues within each individual country.[7] The present book attempts to be more comprehensive in assessing the political, economic, cultural, and leadership dimensions of this bilateral relationship, and is aimed at

scholars, policymakers, civil society actors, and the general reader. The essay form is an important one that seems to be becoming increasingly antiquated, so this book seeks to contribute to its revival in a bid to reach a wider audience beyond the ivory tower. This volume also seeks to promote greater understanding of Africa's most indispensable relationship.

The first three essays of this 13-chapter book assess Nigeria–South Africa relations in the areas of politics, economics, and culture. In the area of politics, this relationship has always represented a mix of cooperation and competition. Bilateral ties have, in fact, been akin to a Shakespearean drama in four acts: the first is set in the apartheid era from 1960 to 1993; the second act occurred during the rule of South Africa's Nelson Mandela and Nigeria's General Sani Abacha, from 1994 to 1998; the third act during the presidencies of Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa's Thabo Mbeki from 1999 to 2007; and the fourth act falls in the period between 2008 and 2017.

After 1960, as South Africa became diplomatically isolated during the apartheid era and was forced to bear the brunt of international sanctions, Nigeria emerged as the prophet, South Africa the pariah. The nadir of relations between both countries was reached after the hanging by the General Sani Abacha regime of Nigerian environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his fellow Ogoni environmental and human rights campaigners in November 1995. South Africa's Nelson Mandela protested but found himself diplomatically isolated in Africa in seeking to impose economic and political sanctions on the military regime in Abuja.

The 'golden age' of the bilateral relationship occurred between 1999 and 2007 during the presidencies of South Africa's Thabo Mbeki and Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo. Both leaders worked closely at managing African crises in Liberia, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi; at promoting norms of democratic governance through the African Union and the African Peer Review Mechanism, and at establishing the New Partnership for Africa's Development as an economic blueprint for promoting the continent's socio-economic development. Many of these institutions and plans have, however, subsequently become moribund.

Under the presidencies of Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan and South Africa's Jacob Zuma between 2010 and 2015, there were disagreements between Abuja and Tshwane over divergent approaches to tackling the

conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011 and Guinea-Bissau in 2013. Encouragingly, the first meeting of the binational commission in four years took place in May 2012, with both sides agreeing to relax visa requirements, particularly for business people. They also agreed to strengthen African regional bodies and push for reform of the UN Security Council. Importantly, an implementation committee was to meet after six months to review progress. Ten binational commission meetings had been held between 1999 and 2013 to coordinate political and economic relations, with Nigeria and South Africa alternating as hosts. Jacob Zuma paid a state visit to new Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari in March 2016 with a pledge to strengthen political, economic, and social ties. However, delays in the implementation of agreements and visa restrictions continued in 2017.

In the area of economics, though South Africa is the most industrialised country in Africa, Nigeria overtook South Africa as the continent's largest economy in 2014. South Africa briefly overtook Nigeria again in 2016, but Nigeria regained the top spot by 2017. This book will examine economic ties between Abuja and Tshwane, using the historical legacy of Pax Britannica and the impact particularly of two British imperialists on both countries' development: Cecil Rhodes in South Africa and Frederick Lugard in Nigeria. While Rhodes sought political federation for economic expansion, Lugard sought political federation for administrative convenience. Nigeria is now one of South Africa's largest trading partners in Africa. Bilateral trade increased massively in a relationship worth R55 billion a year by 2016. The Nigerian market of 180 million consumers is three times larger than South Africa's. South Africa also has six big cities, compared to Nigeria's 27. As we have noted, there have been tensions in this relationship, which many Nigerians regard as having one-sidedly benefited South African companies, while the South African market has remained largely closed to Nigerian companies.

In the sphere of culture and 'soft power',[8] Nigeria's film industry – Nollywood – is a veritable source of soft power that has expanded Nigerian values across the continent and its diaspora, creating an authentically African cinema in the process with which many local populations can identify. World-class Nigerian footballers in European leagues and the national football team, the Super Eagles, as well as many internationally acclaimed Nigerian writers, musicians and singers are all also signs of the country's soft power.

South Africa has similarly spread its 'soft power' abroad through its four Nobel peace laureates – Albert Luthuli, Desmond Tutu, Nelson Mandela, and F.W. de Klerk – as well as through its Nobel literature laureates Nadine Gordimer and J.M. Coetzee and famous musicians. The country successfully organised Africa's first soccer World Cup in 2010 and its first rugby World Cup in 1995 (which it won); and is a magnet for tourists from the rest of Africa and around the world. South Africa's main export to the rest of the continent is its ubiquitous fast-food chains such as Nando's, Steers, and Spur as well as its American-style 'mall culture'. These represent further symbols of the country's 'soft power' known collectively as 'South Africa Inc'.[9] While Nigeria promotes a visual 'soft power', South Africa champions a 'soft power' of the belly.

The second section of the book will examine the issue of hegemony – leadership that seeks to demonstrate both capacity and legitimacy – in relation to Nigeria and South Africa. Pax Nigeriana describes the country's historical ambition to play a political, economic, and military leadership role in Africa or on issues related to Africa. Politically, Nigeria has sought to exert its leadership at the UN and in African regional bodies, and to speak loudest for African concerns. Militarily, it has sent peacekeepers to the Congo, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Somalia, and historically provided military assistance to liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Economically, Nigeria has sought to exert its leadership through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and by providing economic assistance to its poorer neighbours. This section will also assess South Africa's foreign policy role in the rest of Africa since 1994. The final chapter of this second section examines the complementary and conflicting roles of South Africa and Nigeria in promoting the emerging norm of the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) on their own continent.

The third section of the book consists of four essays on the contributions to the bilateral relationship and the leadership roles of four prominent South Africans and Nigerians: Nelson Mandela, Sani Abacha, Thabo Mbeki, and Olusegun Obasanjo. The relationship between Mandela and Abacha – the first post-apartheid leaders of both countries – was significant in marking the nadir of diplomatic relations between Abuja and Tshwane in 1995–6. In contrast, the relationship between Mbeki and Obasanjo represented the zenith of that relationship between 1999 and 2007, as both countries

collaborated to build new continental institutions, manage conflicts, and increase Africa's voice in the world. The era of these four leaders thus represent the lowest and highest points of the bilateral relationship over the past two and a half decades.

The fourth section of the book concludes by assessing three visionary technocrats from both countries: Nigeria's Adebayo Adedeji, South Africa's Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and Nigeria's Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. All three 'visionaries' proved, however, to be prophets who failed to fulfil their missions. As executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa between 1975 and 1991 and as chair of an AU audit report in 2007, Adedeji sought to promote national self-sufficiency and regional integration in Africa; and as chair of the African Peer Review Mechanism between 2007 and 2010 (including leading the South African review in 2007), he sought to promote democratic governance on the continent. As chair of the African Union Commission between 2012 and 2016, Dlamini-Zuma crafted a 50-year vision for the continent, *Agenda 2063*, which did not take sufficient account of Adedeji's 2007 five-year AU audit report. As Nigeria's finance minister between 2003 and 2006 and again from 2011 to 2015, Okonjo-Iweala sought to 'reform the unreformable' with a programme to put Nigeria's economy, infrastructure, and government administration on a sound footing. But despite her heroic efforts, Okonjo-Iweala faltered during her second term.

Debates and Discourses

The debates and discourses concerning the bilateral relationship between Nigeria and South Africa have sometimes been heated. One example is a debate I had with Mills Soko, the South African director of the University of Cape Town's Graduate School of Business in the pages of South African newspaper *Business Day*, which I reproduce here, from my own perspective.[10]

The article by Mills Soko, 'SA Too Timid in Handling Nigeria',[11] in May 2015 was a prime example of the perils of academic journalism. The author argued that South Africa had 'pursued a policy of appeasement' towards Nigeria; 'failed to stand up to Nigeria when its national interest has been

undermined'; and described Nigeria's policy towards South Africa as 'a combination of blackmail and misplaced overconfidence'.

But Soko failed to provide evidence of a single instance in which South Africa appeased Nigeria. President Mbeki, in fact, pursued a strategic relationship with Abuja between 1999 and 2007 not so as to appease it, but in recognition that he needed Africa's largest economy, with 20 per cent of the continent's population, to help build regional institutions and increase Africa's leverage in global politics. Alliance building should thus not be confused with appeasement. South Africa also stood up to Nigeria to defend its perceived 'national interest' on numerous occasions, including the election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as African Union Commission chair in July 2012, in the teeth of vociferous Nigerian opposition.

As for the charges of Abuja's blackmail of Tshwane, it is surely stretching this term to use it to describe Nigeria's recalling of its ambassador after xenophobic attacks against its citizens in South Africa in 2015. Nigeria's call for greater access to the South African market to match the large presence of South African firms in Nigeria also scarcely amounts to blackmail. Soko, a professor of business, makes the economically illiterate point that Nigeria has a massive trade surplus with South Africa. The real point, though, is that over 90 per cent of Nigeria's exports to South Africa have been oil, while over 120 South African firms operate in diverse sectors of Nigeria's economy and export to Nigeria diverse goods such as machinery, electrical equipment, wood, paper, tobacco, sugar, plastics, and rubber. More sophisticated analysts such as South Africa's Dianna Games have noted that the greater industrialisation of South Africa's economy has made it more difficult for Nigerian companies to enter the South African market.

Soko acknowledges Nigeria's support for the anti-apartheid struggle, but notes that other countries supported the struggle too. He again misses the point. As President Jacob Zuma observed in the wake of the xenophobic attacks in South Africa in 2015, South African leaders have not done enough to educate their citizens on the debt of gratitude they owe to the continent. Most South Africans are unaware that Nigeria established the Southern African Relief Fund in 1976 to provide South Africans with scholarships. Nigerian diplomats attended meetings of the Front Line States (FLS) of Southern Africa, chaired the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, and hosted a UN Anti-Apartheid Conference in 1977, which

triggered the arms embargo against Pretoria three months later.

Responding to criticisms of the stereotyping of Nigerians as criminals, Soko helpfully tells us that one cannot deny that Nigerian nationals have been involved in crime. This statement is about as insightful as noting that most crimes in South Africa are committed by South African citizens. The point surely is that Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese, Russians, Mozambicans, Moroccans, and Italians also engage in criminal activities, but are not stereotyped in the same way as Nigerian citizens. In 2004, for example, a Johannesburg radio station, 94.7 Highveld, was forced by South Africa's Broadcasting Complaints Commission to apologise after it claimed that Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo was carrying cocaine in his bag when he attended Thabo Mbeki's presidential inauguration.

Throughout this incoherent piece, terms like 'soft power', 'national interest', and 'appeasement' are bandied about without any explanation of what they mean. The lesson of Soko's article is that prejudice masquerading as analysis inevitably results in shoddy academic journalism.[12]

Another more surprising voice of anti-Nigerian sentiment was that of Thabo Mbeki, widely seen as one of the most pan-African political figures in South Africa, who spent a year in exile in Nigeria between 1977 and 1978 as the first head of the ANC office. During a speech at the 14th anniversary of the African Union's African Peer Review Mechanism in South Africa in March 2017, Mbeki responded to criticisms of xenophobic attacks against Nigerian nationals in several communities in Gauteng province by local South Africans, involving the burning of homes and looting of shops. He noted that Nigerian professionals had never been attacked in his country. While this may be largely true, many Nigerian professionals like myself can point to several incidents of xenophobic sentiments and stereotyping. After Mbeki spoke at the meeting, the Zambian high commissioner to South Africa, Emmanuel Mwamba, offered a stinging rebuke, noting that rather than focusing on petty Nigerian drug dealers, Mbeki should instead assess the more complex structural supply chain of drug trafficking that involves nationals from other countries. As Mwamba cautioned: 'It doesn't help labelling Nigerian drug-dealers … as this builds prejudice against Nigerians instead of focusing on the fight against crime.' At the same meeting, Nigerian scholar-diplomat Ibrahim Gambari also noted the widespread involvement of South African nationals in crime, and called for a more effective response

by the South African police in protecting foreign nationals.[13]

* * *

These are the sorts of debates and discourses that this book will tackle. It will be important for Nigeria and South Africa to re-establish a common strategic approach if Africa's voice is to carry weight on the global stage. The bilateral relationship between both countries has been Africa's most strategic partnership over the last two and a half decades. Both countries can act as engines of economic integration and development in their own subregions as well as on the continent. In addition, the combined political clout of the two states represents a potentially formidable force in shaping Africa's integration and representing the continent's interests on the international stage.

While the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa remains potentially the most indispensable in Africa's socio-economic transformation, many tensions remain, as evidenced by the debates cited above. There is both competition and cooperation in these ties, and our interest in this book is to investigate these nuances, as well as the political, economic, and social contrasts between both countries; their leadership roles in Africa; and the achievements and failures of prominent rulers and visionaries from both countries.

Notes

Introduction – Africa's Indispensable Bilateral Relationship

1 Olusegun Obasanjo, 'Nigeria–South Africa: Bond across the Continent', Speech at the Banquet in Honour of President Thabo Mbeki, Abuja, Nigeria, 2 October 2000, reproduced in U. Joy Ogwu and W.O. Alli (eds.), *Years of Reconstruction: Selected Foreign Policy Speeches of Olusegun Obasanjo* (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2007), p. 296.
2 Cited in 'Nigeria, South Africa Trade Volume Fell to N1.3 Trillion in 2016', *Premium Times* (Nigeria), 9 February 2017 (www.premiumtimesng.com).
3 See Thinus Ferreira, 'Nigerians Furious That Big Brother Naija Is Filmed in SA,' *Channel 24*, 26 January 2017 (www.channel24.co.za); and Ebuka Onyeji, 'Nigerian Government Steps In, Probes Why Big Brother Naija Moved to South Africa,' *Premium Times*, 24 January 2017 (www.premiumtimesng.com).
4 See the insightful essay by Kimberly Nichele Brown, '"Every Brother Ain't a Brother": Cultural Dissonance and Nigerian Malaise in *District 9*'s New South Africa', in Maryellen Higgins (ed.), *Hollywood's Africa after 1994* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2012), pp. 193–206.
5 I am indebted for these two points to Ali A. Mazrui, *A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa as Contrasting Visions* (London: Adonis and Abbey, 2006), pp. 27–28.
6 Cited in Femke van Zeijl, 'Northern Nigeria: Refuge for IDPs Fleeing Boko Haram', *Al Jazeera*, 16 July 2017 (www.aljazeera.com).
7 Mazrui, *A Tale of Two Africas*.
8 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
9 This expression has been used by, among others, Brendan Vickers and Richard Cawood, 'South Africa's Corporate Expansion: Towards an "SA Inc." Approach in Africa', in Adekeye Adebajo and Kudrat Virk (eds.), *Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Security, Diplomacy, and Trade* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018), pp. 131–150
10 See Adekeye Adebajo, 'No Evidence of SA's Appeasement of Nigeria', in *Business Day* (South Africa), 15 June 2015 (www.businesslive.co.za).
11 Mills Soko, 'SA Too Timid in Handling Nigeria', *Business Day* (South Africa), 29 May 2015.
12 For further responses to these debates, see the two letters by Adekeye Adebajo

and Mills Soko in *Business Day* (South Africa) in June 2015 (www.businesslive.co.za).

13 See Carien du Plessis, 'Mbeki Has Again Reminded Us All Why South Africa Had to Let Him Go', *Huffington Post* (South Africa), 9 March 2017 (www.huffingtonpost.co.za); African News Agency, 'Mbeki to Meet with African Ambassadors after Xenophobia Debate', 9 March 2017 (www.citizen.co.za); Wale Odunsi, 'Xenophobia: Protesters Storm MTN Abuja Office', *Daily Post* (Nigeria), 23 February 2017 (www.dailypost.ng); and Mike Cohen, 'SA Faces Continent's Wrath as Xenophobia Rears Its Head Again', *Mail & Guardian* (South Africa), 28 February 2017 (www.mg.co.za).