Title: South Africa’s waning influence in South Sudan: Mediation and Economic Interests
Author: Orapeleng Matshediso is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation at the University of Johannesburg.
Date: 18 November 2026
This blog argues that South Africa’s economic interests have, to some extent, compromised its influence, diplomatic engagement, and impartial mediation in South Sudan.
Eighteen years ago, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) formally appointed former South African President Thabo Mbeki as the mediator for Sudan and South Sudan. He first served as chairperson of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), which examined and defined the causes of violent conflict in the then-Sudan. The panel presented its findings and recommendations to the Peace and Security Council as required.
In the main, the Panel found that the violent conflict in Darfur mirrors the country’s overarching polycrisis. In its view, the causes of conflict stem from the systematic exclusion of the people of Darfur, Southern Sudan, and other parts from the centre of power and governance, and from the state’s control over resources.
The panel further stated that the challenges are systemic and political, and that achieving inclusive peace and nation-building would require political will, strong leadership, concerted efforts across society, and an active citizenry. The panel was subsequently re-mandated as the AU High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) to implement its findings and recommendations. The chairperson of the two panels, President Thabo Mbeki, and his team mastered the conceptual framework, the importance of ‘mediator behaviour’, and the underlying assumptions.
This conceptual framework assumes that, for mediation to succeed, mediators’ choice of strategic approach matters, and that strategy should be informed by the warring parties’ nature, an inclusive, in-depth consultative approach, available resources, and the nature of the conflict. On the other hand, some authors argue that South Sudan needs mediators who would apply transformative mediation, which allows for broader inclusivity and empowers the warring parties to pave their way to peace and to recognise their divergent views and perspectives on the cause of the conflict and what constitutes peacebuilding processes.
The AUPSC trusted the panel leadership because, in its examination, definition and mediation of the conflict, it strategically took charge of the mediation processes, not of substantive decisions, such as choosing the venue for negotiation, but allowed substantive decision-making to be taken by the warring parties, civil society organisations, and the broader South Sudanese population, including decisions on the contents of the peace agreements and their subsequent implementation.
The Panel continued to fulfil its mandate even after Southern Sudan seceded from the North, leading to the birth of Africa’s newest state, South Sudan, 15 years ago. This mediation panel, led by South Africa, has, to a certain extent, laid a strong diplomatic and influential foundation for South Africa among South Sudanese leaders and citizens, as well as across the continent.
However, this balanced, somewhat inclusive, and impartial approach to mediation proved short-lived because South Africa appears to have flip-flopped diplomatically; it apparently prioritised economic interests over impartial mediation and the aspirations of the disenfranchised. This purported foreign policy blunder became glaringly apparent in 2018, when the South Sudanese transition government, led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit, offered the South African government an oil-rich area of land to explore for oil and to build oil refineries in the world’s newest state.
The implementation process was halted by violent conflict and delays in reconstituting the revitalised transition government of national unity, as required by the 2018 revitalised agreement. However, in 2022, South Africa appointed Advocate Mahlodi Muofhe as its new ambassador to South Sudan.
Advocate Muofhe reignited the process and ensured that South African geologists and scientists travelled to South Sudan to geo-map the oil-rich portion of the land offered. To date, Pretoria has invested more than one billion dollars in the petroleum area known as Nile Orange Energy. Notably, the South African state-owned company South African National Petroleum owns 90%, while South Sudan’s national oil firm, Nilepet, owns only 10% of Nile Orange Energy.
Arguably, this suggests that South Sudan’s current transitional President, Salva Kiir, adopted a strategic posture of patronising South Africa by providing economic resources, given South Africa’s influential role as the current chairperson of the AU Ad hoc high-level committee on South Sudan (C5).
The AU PSC initially established the C5 in 2015 to support the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in its efforts to achieve lasting peace in the country; however, in 2018 the C5 was re-mandated to oversee the implementation of the revitalised peace agreement to restore stability and achieve lasting peace.
From 2018 until early 2026, the C5 did little to assist and support the revitalised government in effectively implementing the revitalised agreement; this can be attributed to the aforementioned strategic economic patronage. In January, it convened in Juba to prepare a progress report for the PSC and, subsequently, for the 39th ordinary AU summit of heads of state. As a leader of the C5, South Africa bears, to a certain extent, the brunt of its failures.
In reality, the C5 appears less effective than the AUPD and AUHIP. It can be argued that, to a certain extent, Thabo Mbeki mastered economic diplomacy by adopting a balanced approach that aligned the continental agenda for a peaceful continent with South Africa’s economic interests. In his balanced approach, he has, to a large extent, applied transformative mediation by allowing and empowering warring parties to determine how the conflict should be resolved and which mechanism is suitable for the peacebuilding process in the post-violent-conflict situation.
However, South Africa currently seems to have been carried away by its own national interests, to the detriment of the continental agenda (aspirations 4 and 6 of the AU Agenda 2063 – building a peaceful continent where development is people-centred and driven) and the suffering of the poor and working class in South Sudan.
To illustrate how South Africa’s influence as a mediator has waned in South Sudan, in 2020 the late Deputy President, David Mabuza, acting as the presidential special envoy, travelled to Juba and presented a proposal to the warring parties.
He proposed resolving the dispute over the number of states and boundaries in South Sudan by using external arbitration to break the impasse. Both the transitional government and the dominant opposition rejected it, saying it was inconsistent with the provisions of the revitalised agreement and the 2011 transitional constitution. He was reminded that the constitution still recognises 10 states and that the revitalised agreement includes a provision for establishing an independent boundary commission to examine and recommend to the constitutional review committee how boundaries and state issues could be resolved. Mabuza’s proposal was further rejected by an opposition alliance of 10 unarmed groups, and questions were raised about whether he has capable advisors on international relations.
Again, in 2020, after President Cyril Ramaphosa became the AU chairperson, he called on the two dominant warring parties, President Salva Kiir and his first deputy, Riek Machar, to urgently form the revitalised government. Machar set a condition: he would be available only if the dispute over the number of states were resolved before the transitional government was formed.
Machar and his people also accused both Ramaphosa and Mabuza of being soft and biased towards Kiir on the straightforward issue of states and boundary rezoning. Kiir acceded to Machar’s condition only after IGAD leadership, and apparently the troika of (the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom), engaged him. One could argue that South Africa’s diplomatic blunder, characterised by a lack of strategic foresight in engaging with warring parties on constitutional imperatives and a revitalised peace agreement, and by waning influence, has subjected its mediation to serious public criticism and scrutiny.
In 2019, Simon Allison wrote an article in the Mail and Guardian newspaper criticising South Africa and South Sudan’s oil and a one-billion-dollar investment deal. He argued that the deals’ contents were kept secret, including how the investment in energy in South Sudan would contribute to South Africa’s broader strategy on energy generation and supply, and that the government also failed to indicate where the one billion dollars would come from. Even Kabelo Khumalo (2026) posits that the oil deal was signed despite opposition from South African energy experts and some opposition parties.
In principle, South Africa should continue to respect South Sudan’s sovereignty and the importance of inclusive peacebuilding while advancing its national economic interests. It also has a responsibility to support the aspirations of the AU Agenda 2063, particularly its emphasis on building a peaceful continent and development driven by people on the ground. However, its influence is waning, and it lacks strategic and economic diplomacy and foresight. Therefore, it needs to assess and review its mediation approach in South Sudan and develop a clear, sound strategic diplomatic trajectory to help restore its influence in mediation efforts aimed at bringing political stability and lasting peace to South Sudan. This means mediators (including South Africa) should anchor their mediation in a bottom-up approach and maximum inclusivity, and allow the warring parties space to pave the path to lasting peace without imposing clauses in their peace agreements.
References
Allison, S. (2019) ‘Suspicion and secrecy surround South Africa’s dealings with South Sudan’: https://mg.co.za/news/africa/2019-06-21-suspicion-and-secrecy-surround-south-africa-s-dealings-with-south-sudan/
Fabricius, P. (2020) ‘South Sudan’s deal reveals flaws in Pretoria’s approach to mediation’: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-sudans-peace-deal-reveals-flaws-in-pretorias-approach-to-mediation
Kumalo, K. (2026) ‘SA Pushes ahead with troubled South Sudan Oil Deal’ https://www.sundaytimes.timeslive.co.za/business/news/2026-10-10-sa-pushes-ahead-with-troubled-south-sudan-oil-deal/
Thabo Mbeki and World Peace Foundations (2024) ‘Defining the Crisis in the Sudans: Lessons from the African Union High-Level Panels for Sudan and South Sudan’: https://www.mbeki.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/TMF-Crisis-in-The-Sudans-Report-Digital.pdf